For providing a secure distributed computer environment, efficient and flexible user authentication and key agreement is very important. In addition to user authentication and key agreement, identity privacy is very useful for users. In this paper, we propose an efficient and flexible password authenticated key agreement scheme using bilinear pairings. The main merits include: (1) there is no need for any password or verification table in the server; (2) users can choose or change his own password freely; (3) both the server and a user can authenticate each other; (4) it can protect the user's privacy; (5) the user and the server can generate a session key; (6) it does not have a serious synchronization-clock problem; (7) even if the secret information stored in a smart card is compromised, it can prevent the offline dictionary attack.
Introduction
In order to authenticate users, password-based security techniques have been widely used in many remote login systems because they are easily implemented. In 1981, Lamport [1] proposed a password authentication scheme to realize user authentication. Later, Shimizu [2] pointed out the weakness of Lamport's scheme [1] and proposed a modified scheme. Then, many improved remote user authentication schemes [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have been proposed.
In 2006, Das et al. [11] proposed a remote user authentication scheme using bilinear pairings. They claimed that their proposed scheme using smart cards can prevent many logged-in users with the same login-ID, and provision the users to change the passwords without the support of the server. In addition, they claimed that their proposed scheme is secure against the replay attack, the forgery attack and the insider attack. In [12] , Chou et al. pointed out a replay attack for Das et al.'s scheme and gave a simple improvement to fix this weakness. Also, in [13] , Goriparthi et al. pointed out that Das et al.'s scheme will suffer the replay attack and the forgery attack. We find that Das et al.'s scheme is easily vulnerable to another replay attack. This replay attack can also be applied to the improvement scheme mentioned in [12] . We also find that Das et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the offline dictionary attack with or without a smart card. Also, their proposed scheme lacks many nice properties, such as, identity protection, mutual authentication, and session key agreement, etc.
In this paper, we use bilinear pairings to propose an efficient and flexible password authenticated key agreement scheme. Our proposed scheme can provide many nice properties, such as, identity protection, session key agreement, no synchronization-clock problem, mutual authentication, and revoking a smart card without changing user's identity, etc.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Das et al.'s scheme. In Section 3, we point out the security weaknesses of Das et al.'s scheme. In Section 4, we describe our proposed scheme. In Section 5, we analyze the security of our scheme. In Section 6, we compare our proposed scheme with the related schemes. Finally, we make a conclusion in Section 7.
Review of Das et al.'s scheme
A remote authentication scheme using bilinear pairings was proposed by Das et al. [11] . Their method consists of four phases: (1) the setup phase, (2) the registration phase, (3) the authentication phase, and (4) the password changing phase. In the setup phase, the server first setups the system parameters, and publishes the public information. In the registration phase, a user gives his identity information to the server for registration. In the authentication phase, a user uses his smart card to send a login request message to the server and if the submitted request message is valid, the server will accept it. In the password changing phase, the user can change his password.
The setup phase
Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group of a prime order q, and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order. Let P be a generator of G 1 ,ê : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear mapping and H : {0, 1} * → G 1 be a cryptographic one-way hash function which maps a string to a point of the additive cyclic group G 1 [11, 12] . The server chooses a secret key s and computes the corresponding public key Pub RS = s P. The server publishes the system parameters G 1 , G 2 ,ê, q, P, Pub RS , H and keeps s secret.
The registration phase
Assume that user i submits his identity ID i and his password PW i to the server for registration. If the server accepts this request, he will perform the following steps:
Step R1: Compute
Step R2: Store (ID i , Reg ID i , H ) to the memory of a smart card and issue this smart card to user i.
The authentication phase
If user i wants to log into the server, he must insert his smart card to a card reader. Then, he inputs his identity ID i and the password PW i to this device. The smart card then performs the following steps:
Step L1: Compute DID i = T · Reg ID i , where T is the user system's timestamp.
Step L2:
Step L3: Send the message (ID i , DID i , V i , T ) to the server. Assume that the server receives the login message (ID i , DID i , V i , T ) at time T * (≥T ). The server authenticates the user with the following steps:
Step V1: The server verifies if the time difference between T and T * is less than the maximum transmission latency ∆T . If no, he rejects the request.
Step V2: The server verifies ifê(DID i − V i , P) =ê(H (ID i ), Pub RS ) T . If no, the server rejects the request. Otherwise, the server accepts the user's request.
The password changing phase
When the user needs to change his password, he can perform the following steps:
Step P1: The user inserts the smart card to a card reader and inputs his ID i and PW i .
Step P2: The user inputs a new password PW * i .
Step P3: The smart card computes Reg *
Weaknesses of Das et al.'s scheme

Suffering the replay attack
In the replay attack [12] [13] [14] [15] , an adversary can deceive or impersonate another eligible user through the reuse of information obtained in a previous session. In Das et al.'s authentication scheme, if an adversary can tap the used message (ID i , DID i , V i , T ) sent by an eligible user to the server in Step L3 of the authentication phase, he can use this information to generate a valid request message for impersonating eligible user i with the identification ID i . We now show how to use this information in the replay attack.
If an adversary can get the message (ID i , DID i , V i , T ) sent to the server in the previous login request, he can forge another valid message (ID i , DID * i , V * i , T * ) to impersonate user i via the following steps: The login phase:
Step 1: Get the current timestamp T * , and compute c = T * /T = T * T −1 (mod q), DID * i = c · DID i , and
Step 2: Send the message (ID i , DID * i , V * i , T * ) to the server. The authentication phase:
Upon receiving the message (ID i , DID * i , V * i , T * ) at the time T , the server authenticates the user with the following steps:
Step 1: The server checks if the time difference between T * and T is less than the maximum transmission latency. Since T * is the current timestamp of the user system, the server will not reject this request.
Step 2: The server verifies ifê(
, the server will accept the adversary's request. In [12] , Chou et al. pointed out a replay attack for Das et al.'s scheme and gave a simple improvement to fix this weakness. Their improvement is just modifying the verification equationê
. This improvement cannot prevent the replay attack mentioned in this paper. The reason is as follows. After the server receiving the the message (ID i , DID * i , V * i , T * ) at the time T , the server first checks whether the time difference (T − T * ) is less than the maximum transmission latency and then verifies ifê(
, the server will accept the adversary's request. So the improvement scheme in [12] cannot prevent the replay attack proposed in this paper.
Suffering the offline dictionary attack with or without the smart card
In Das et al.'s authentication scheme [11] , if a malicious person taps the message
Step L3 of the authentication phase, he can use (V i = T · H (PW i ), T ) to do the offline dictionary attack for the weak password PW i since the entropy of PW i is small. Their scheme is also suffering the offline dictionary attack with the smart card [3] .
Suffering the insider attack
If the password of a user can be derived by the server in the registration protocol, it is called the insider attack [4] . In Das et al.'s scheme [11] , the server can get all the users' passwords in the registration phase. The insider of the server can use these passwords to access other servers with the same passwords [5] .
Poor repairability
In Das et al.'s authentication scheme [11] , since the shared key Reg ID i = s H (ID i ) + H (PW i ) depends on the user's identification, the repairability property is not enough [5, 16] .
Our proposed scheme
There are two entities in our scheme including a user's smart card and the server. The scheme consists of four phases: the setup phase, the registration phase, the login phase, and the password changing phase. Table 1 Notations used in our proposed scheme
An additive cyclic group of a prime order q G 2 A multiplicative cyclic group of the same prime order q P A generator of the group G 1 e A bilinear mapping, which maps two points in G 1 to a point in G 2 H A cryptographic one-way hash function which maps a string to a point of the additive cyclic group G 1 h A secure one-way hash function which maps a string to a 160 bits string E x A secure symmetric encryption algorithm with the secret key x D x A secure symmetric decryption algorithm with the secret key x The ordinary string concatenation operation ID s
The identification of the server ID i
The
A password chosen by the user Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group of a prime order q, and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order. Let P be a generator of G 1 andê : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear mapping [11, 12] . Let H : {0, 1} * → G 1 be a cryptographic one-way hash function which maps a string to a point of the additive cyclic group G 1 [12, 13] . Let h(·) be a secure one-way hash function [17] . Let E x ()/D x () be a secure symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm with the secret key x [18] , and be the ordinary string concatenation operation. Let ID s be the identification of the server and ID i be the identification of user i. We summarize the notations in Table 1 .
The setup phase
The server selects a secret key s and computes the public key as s P. He also randomly chooses a master symmetric secret key x and keeps it secret. Then the server publishes the public information P s = s P, P and keeps s, x secret.
The registration phase
If user i with the identity ID i would like to register with the server, she/he performs the following protocol with the server.
R1. The server verifies user i through a secure identification scheme. If user i is eligible, then user i selects her/his password PW i and a random number b, computes h (PW i b), and sends {ID i , h (PW i b)} to the server in a secure channel.
R2. The server encrypts the hashed password by computing
R3. The server stores b i in a smart card and delivers it to user i in a secure channel. The user conserves PW i and the smart card secretly for future login processes. R4. After user i receives the smart card, he inputs b into the smart card. The memory of the smart card contains
For each user, the registration phase is performed once. If the user loses his/her smart card, he/she can perform the registration protocol with the server again.
The login phase
Once user i wants to login to the server, she/he first inserts her/his smart card into a card reader and inputs his identity ID i and the password PW i . The login protocol is shown in Fig. 1 . The smart card and the server cooperate to perform the following operations.
L1. Choose a random number a and compute a P. L2. Compute k a = h(a P P s Q ê (P s , a Q)), where Q = H (ID s ). L3. Use the secret key k a to encrypt b i as α = E K a (b i ). L4. Send a P, α to the server over a public channel.
Let the server receive the message a P, α . L5. The server computes k a = h(a P P s Q ê (a P, s Q)), uses the private key k a to decrypt α via
The server chooses a random number r , computes sk = h (k a r ID i ID s ), and Auth s = h (k a h (PW i b) r sk). L7. The server sends Auth s , r to user i over a public channel.
Let user i receive the message Auth s , r from the server. 
The password changing phase
If user i wants to change his password, he needs to agree on a session key with the server via the login phase in advance. Then he uses the session key sk to encrypt the changing password message {ID i , h(PW * 
Security analysis
In this section, we examine the security of our propose scheme.
(1) Preventing the insider attack
The insider of the server can use this password to impersonate the user to login another server. In our scheme, the user will choose a random number b and generate h (PW i b). Then he sends h (PW i b) to the server for registration. The server cannot know the password PW i since the entropy of b is very large. (2) Preventing the replay attack In order to prevent the replay attack [4, 14, 15] , the nonces a and r are used in our scheme to prevent this kind of attacks. In our scheme, user i first chooses a nonce a, computes a P, and sends it to the server. The second nonce r is chosen by the server and embedded in the session key sk and the authenticator Auth s = h (k a h (PW i b) r sk). 
) and b are stored in smart card by user i at the registration phase. An attacker cannot make a valid b i without the information of the server's secret key x and the user's password PW i . (4) Preventing the offline dictionary attack without the smart card
In order to prevent this attack [3] , the transmitted messages of our scheme do not have enough information to check the validability of the password. The first message between a user and the server of our scheme is {a P, α}. If the attacker intercepts this message, the attacker also cannot derive PW i because the attacker do not know the secret key x. The attacker cannot decrypt b i to get h (PW i b). So it is impossible for the attacker to do the offline dictionary attack by this message. If the attacker intercepts the message Auth i , the attacker also does not have enough information to derive the password since the entropy of k a , b, r , and sk are all very large. (5) Preventing the offline dictionary attack with the smart card This attack is similar to the offline dictionary attack without the smart card, but the attacker can get the smart card and acquire the secret information stored in a smart card [3] . In our scheme, the password stored in a smart card is embedded in b i . Only the valid server can use the master secret key x to decrypt b i to acquire the hashed password h (PW i b) . If the attacker gets the smart card and acquires the secret information stored in the smart card, before the attacker can forge the valid user, he must generate Auth i = h (k a h (PW i b) r + 1 sk). In this situation, the attacker can obtain the correct k a , r and sk, but the attacker cannot generate the correct h (PW i b) since h (PW i b) can only be generated by the eligible user online or be derived by the server by decrypting
. So the attacker cannot get the correct password and create the authenticator Auth i .
Performance considerations
The performance consideration of our scheme and related schemes is shown in Table 2 . There are many articles addressing the implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems and bilinear pairing on elliptic curve [19] . At the 163 bit elliptic curve cryptosystems and 1024 bit RSA security level, one scalar multiplication of elliptic curve point is roughly 5-15 times as fast as the RSA signing operation depending on the optimization and platform. Also, as mentioned in [20] , one MD5/SHA operation is roughly 10 times as fast as one DES encryption/decryption operation and one DES encryption/decryption operation is roughly 1000 times as fast as the 1024 bit RSA signing operation. We assume that the identifications can be represented with 32 bits, a point in an elliptic curve can be represented with 163 × 2 = 326 bits, the output size of secure one-way hash functions is 160 bits, the size of a timestamp is 32 bits, and the size of a random number is 64 bits.
In the login phase of our proposed scheme, user i needs to send the message a P, α to the server. It contains 163×2+(160+32+160) = 678 bits. The server then sends Auth s , r back to user i. It contains 160+64 = 224 bits. The login phase in Das et al.'s scheme [11] needs three scalar multiplications in elliptic curve, two hashings to point operations, two bilinear pairing operation, and one point addition. Our scheme requires three scalar multiplications in elliptic curve, ten hashing operations, two bilinear pairing operations, and two symmetric encryption or decryption operations in the login phase. We summarize the functionality of our scheme and related schemes in Table 3 . If the authentication scheme is a password-table-based, the server needs to store a password table including the passwords or the hashed passwords of all registered users for verification and the server needs to keep the table in secret. In our scheme, the hashed password is embedded in
After receiving b i in the login protocol, the server can decrypt it to get the hashed password of the user without keeping the password table. In our scheme, the server necessitates keeping a registration table. It does not need to be kept secret and it is smaller than the password table and the table is easily maintained.
In our scheme, each user can choose her/his favorite password in the registration phase. It will make users easy to remember their own passwords. We provide the mechanism of changing password. It seems impossible to change passwords without the help of the server when the function of preventing the offline dictionary attack with the smart card is provided. The reason is that the hashed password stored in the smart card must be encrypted by the server's secret key. Only the server can decrypt it and then change it. In the login phase, our scheme is based on nonces, instead of timestamps. Das et al.'s scheme [11] is based on timestamps and has a serious time-synchronization problem. In our scheme, the identity of user iID i is embedded in b i and is encrypted by the one-time secret key k a . Only the server can decrypt the message to get ID i . Thus, our scheme provides identity protection. In Das et al.'s scheme [11] , the user's identity ID i is sent to the server in plaintext. Anyone can know ID i easily. In our scheme, if a user loses his smart card, he can revoke his smart card. The server can issue a new smart card to the user and cancel the lost card. For easily identifying the new card, b i = E x (h (PW i b) ID i h(h(PW i b) ID i )) can be replaced as b i = E x (h (PW i b) ID i j h(h(PW i b) ID i )), where j is the number of cards revoked for user i. The server needs to record j for each user i in a registration table. In Das et al.'s scheme [11] , they cannot revoke a lost card without changing the user's identity. In our scheme, both user i and the server can agree a session key sk = h (k a r ID i ID s ) in the login phase. But in Das et al.'s scheme [11] , they do not provide the key agreement mechanism.
Conclusion
In this paper, we use bilinear pairings to propose an efficient and flexible password authenticated key agreement scheme. Our scheme can provide many nice properties, such as, identity protection, mutual authentication, revoking a smart card without changing user's identity, session key agreement, and no synchronization-clock problem. Also, if the secret information stored in a smart card is compromised, our scheme can prevent the offline dictionary attack.
